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The Future of International Law Is Domestic 




International law has traditionally been just that—international. Consisting 
of a largely separate set of legal rules and institutions,1 international law has 
long governed relationships among states. Under the traditional rules of 
international law, the claims of individuals could reach the international plane 
only when a state exercised diplomatic protection and espoused the claims of 
its nationals in an international forum.2 More recently, international law has 
penetrated the once exclusive zone of domestic affairs to regulate the relation-
ships between governments and their own citizens, particularly through the 
growing bodies of human rights law and international criminal law.3 But even 
in these examples, international law has recognized a clear demarcation be-
tween domestic and international politics. 
The classic model of international law as separate from the domestic realm 
reºects the traditional problems the international legal system sought to ad-
dress, namely the facilitation of state-to-state cooperation and the treatment 
of one state’s nationals by another state. Whether regulating the immunities 
of diplomats or the rights of ships on the high seas, the traditional purposes 
of international law have been interstate, not intrastate. 
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1. This approach is closely linked to the monist view of international law. Monists argue that interna-
tional law and domestic law are part of the same system, in which international law is hierarchically prior 
to domestic law. Dualists, in contrast, claim that international and domestic law are part of two distinct 
systems and that domestic law is generally prior to international law. See generally J. G. Starke, Monism 
and Dualism in the Theory of International Law, 17 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 66 (1936). While both of these 
theories provide important linkages between international law and domestic law, for adherents of either 
approach the functions and institutions of international law remain largely at the international level. See 
generally id. 
2. See Mavromatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 12 (Aug. 
30). Yet the decision of a state to espouse its citizen’s claim is one of domestic politics—the state has no 
obligation to do so. International law does, however, regulate the right of the state to espouse an individ-
ual claim, limiting such rights to cases of “close connection,” usually in the form of “real and effective 
nationality” between the state and the citizen. See, e.g., Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 
(Apr. 6). 
3. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitutional Moment, 
43 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1 (2002). 
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This foundation of international law reºects the principles of Westphalian 
sovereignty, often seemingly made up of equal parts myth and rhetoric. In 
this conception, the state is a deªned physical territory “within which do-
mestic political authorities are the sole arbiters of legitimate behavior.”4 States 
can be part of the international legal system to the degree they choose by 
consenting to particular rules. Likewise, they can choose to remain apart, assert-
ing their own sovereignty and eschewing international involvement. For-
mally, Westphalian sovereignty is the right to be left alone, to exclude, to be 
free from any external meddling or interference. But it is also the right to be 
recognized as an autonomous agent in the international system, capable of 
interacting with other states and entering into international agreements. With 
these background understandings of sovereignty, an international legal sys-
tem, consisting of states and limited by the principle of state consent, emerged. 
Today, however, the challenges facing states and the international com-
munity alike demand very different responses from and thus new roles for 
the international legal system. The processes of globalization and the emergence 
of new transnational threats have fundamentally changed the nature of gov-
ernance and the necessary purposes of international law in the past few years. 
From cross-border pollution to terrorist training camps, from refugee ºows 
to weapons proliferation, international problems have domestic roots that an 
interstate legal system is often powerless to address. To offer an effective re-
sponse to these new challenges, the international legal system must be able 
to inºuence the domestic policies of states and harness national institutions 
in pursuit of global objectives. 
To create desirable conditions in the international system, from peace, to 
health to prosperity, international law must address the capacity and the will 
of domestic governments to respond to these issues at their sources. In turn, 
the primary terrain of international law must shift—and is already shifting 
in many instances—from independent regulation above the national state to 
direct engagement with domestic institutions. The three principal forms of 
such engagement are strengthening domestic institutions, backstopping them, 
and compelling them to act. 
The most striking feature of this conception of international law is a di-
rect emphasis on shaping or inºuencing political outcomes within sovereign 
states in accordance with international legal rules. Even in 1945, the drafters 
of the U.N. Charter still maintained the classical position that international 
law and institutions shall not “intervene in matters which are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”5 Today, however, the objectives of 
international law and the very stability of the international system itself de-
pend critically on domestic choices previously left to the determination of 
national political processes—whether to enforce particular rules, establish insti-
tutions, or even engage in effective governance. By ensuring that national 
 
                                                                                                                      
4. See, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy 20 (1999). 
5. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. 
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governments actually function in pursuit of collective aims, international 
law is starting to play a far more active role in shaping these national politi-
cal choices. Assuming that current political, economic, and technological trends 
continue, the future effectiveness of international law will turn on its ability 
to inºuence and alter domestic politics. 
These functions of international law are already well known to the mem-
bers of the European Union (“EU”). Indeed, in extending membership to ten 
new countries over the course of the past decade, the EU has relied on EU 
law as its primary tool of reform and socialization.6 Even among the original 
member states, EU institutions continue to perform the types of backstop-
ping, strengthening, and mandating functions described here. Europeans them-
selves are coming to recognize these uses of law; a new generation of Euro-
pean policy thinkers has openly proclaimed the virtues of the European way 
of law.7 
Some may, of course, argue that these new functions of international law 
have no applicability outside the European context in which they were ªrst 
embraced.8 Yet each of the three means through which international law is 
coming to inºuence domestic outcomes—strengthening domestic institutions, 
backstopping national governance, and compelling domestic action—is spread-
ing beyond the Continent. 
To the extent that what we describe as the “European way of law” is al-
ready evident both within the EU and now in a growing number of other con-
texts, this Article describes an important reorganization of the means and 
mechanisms through which international law operates. Our argument goes 
further, however, by suggesting that these new mechanisms of international 
law have the power to make the system as a whole far more effective. We there-
fore move beyond description and prediction to prescription, suggesting 
ways that the European way of law should become the future of international 
law writ large. 
We also recognize, however, the potential dangers in current trends. As 
we emphasize in the conclusion, our vision of the principal future functions 
of international law assumes an intensive interaction between international 
law and domestic politics. But domestic politicians can manipulate interna-
tional legal institutions and mandates to serve their own purposes, such as 
jailing political dissidents as part of complying with a Security Council reso-
lution requiring domestic action against terrorism. More broadly, the basic 
 
                                                                                                                      
6. See generally Mark Leonard, Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century 43–46 (2005). 
7. See, e.g., id.; Gráinne de Búrca, Beyond the Charter: How Enlargement Has Enlarged the Human Rights 
Policy of the European Union, 27 Fordham Int’l L.J. 679, 680 (2004) (arguing that a similar role of law is 
generating a “more general and comprehensive human rights policy” within the EU). 
8. See, e.g., Eric Posner & John Yoo, Reply to Helfer and Slaughter, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 957, 966 (2005) 
(“There is no reason to think that a court that works for Europe, where political and legal institutions in 
most countries are of high quality, would work for a world political community that lacks the same level 
of cohesion and integration. Whatever one thinks about the EU, it is nothing like the international 
community.”). 
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positivist foundations of international law, requiring states to freely accept 
such interference in domestic politics, raise the possibility of manipulation 
and even imposition of such “acceptance” as a result of power disparities. 
Part I of this Article identiªes a new set of global threats and actual and 
potential responses, including the EU’s uses of law to transform new mem-
bers “from the inside out.” Part II argues that the future relevance, power, 
and potential of international law lie in its ability to backstop, strengthen, 
and compel domestic law and institutions. Part III examines the potential 
pitfalls and dangers of these new functions of international law. Finally, Part 
IV contrasts our analysis with other recent efforts to blur the boundaries be-
tween the international and domestic spheres, noting that what is distinc-
tive about our claim is not the intermingling of two kinds of law, but rather 
the impact of international law on domestic politics and vice versa. 
I. New Threats, New Responses 
Rules can reºect and embody aspirations for a better world. Alternatively, 
and equally likely, rules respond to concrete problems. The changing nature 
of international legal rules today responds to a new generation of worldwide 
problems. The most striking feature of these problems is that they arise from 
within states rather than from state actors themselves. 
Examples abound: the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were 
launched by a group of nonstate actors operating from within the territory of 
Afghanistan;9 the massive ethnic crimes in Rwanda, Congo, and Sudan are, 
in large part, the product of rebel forces within states;10 the most dangerous 
examples of nuclear proliferation can often be attributed to nonstate crimi-
nal networks such as those of A. Q. Kahn.11 The 2004 Report of the Secre-
tary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change identi-
ªes problems of intrastate origin such as “poverty, infectious disease and en-
vironmental degradation . . . civil war, genocide and other large scale atrocities 
. . . nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons, terrorism, [and] 
transnational organized crime” as among the core threats facing the interna-
tional community today.12 
More often than not, the origins of these threats can be addressed directly 
only by domestic governments that have the jurisdictional entitlements, police 
power, and institutional capability to act directly against them. Arresting 
 
                                                                                                                      
9. See generally Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S., The 9/11 Commission Re-
port (2004). 
10. See, e.g., Josias Semujanga, Origins of the Rwandan Genocide (2003); Robert B. Edger-
ton, The Troubled Heart of Africa: A History of the Congo (2002); Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry 
on Darfur, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General 
(Jan. 25, 2005), http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf. 
11. See William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, Pakistani’s Nuclear Black Market Seen as Offering Deepest 
Secrets of Building Bomb, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 2005, at A7. 
12. Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: 
Our Shared Responsibility 2, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
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criminals or terrorists, securing nuclear materials, and preventing pollution 
are within the traditional province of domestic law. The result is that the 
external security of many states depends on the ability of national governments 
to maintain internal security sufªcient to establish and enforce national law. 
Where states are strong enough to combat these internal threats directly, 
international law can and must play a critical coordinating role to ensure that 
governments cooperate in addressing threats before they span borders. Far too 
frequently, however, domestic governments lack the will or the capacity to 
adequately respond to these challenges. Since the early 1990s, the number of 
states unable to effectively govern their territories has increased.13 As Francis 
Fukuyama afªrms, “[s]ince the end of the Cold War, weak or failing states 
have arguably become the single most important problem for the interna-
tional order . . . . Weak or failing states commit human rights abuses, pro-
voke humanitarian disasters, drive massive waves of immigration, and attack 
their neighbors.”14 
Where national governments are unable or unwilling to address the ori-
gins of these threats themselves, international law may step in to help build 
their capacity or stiffen their will. This use of international law moves well 
beyond both its classical deªnition, as “the rights subsisting between na-
tions,”15 and its more modern conception, as, in part, regulating the conduct 
of states toward their own citizens.16 Where human rights law identiªes a 
set of clear prohibitions on government behavior, coupled with a set of posi-
tive aspirations toward economic, social, and cultural rights, these new in-
ternational legal rules seek actively to shape not only domestic law but also 
the domestic political environment to enable and enhance domestic government 
action. The result is far more invasive, but also potentially transformative. 
For many countries, ranging from the United States to Russia, from the coun-
tries of the Middle East to those of Africa, this new use of international law 
is also far more frightening. 
This new model springs from a conception of international law spreading 
outward from Europe. The Treaty of Westphalia, ending the bloody Thirty 
Years War with the principle of cuius regio, eius religio,17 has given way to the 
Treaty of Rome, ending a century of bloody intra-European wars with a con-
 
                                                                                                                      
13. See Jeremy W. Weinstein et al., On the Brink, Weak States and US National Security: 
A Report of the Commission for Weak States and US National Security 9–12 (2004) (describ-
ing recent incidences of state failure); see also Stuart E. Eizenstat & John Edward Porter, Weak States Are a 
US Security Threat, Christian Sci. Monitor, June 29, 2004, at 9 (“In those states [Iraq and Haiti] and 
others like them—Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia, and possibly Pakistan—where poor states lose control, 
it’s often Americans who pay the price.”). 
14. Francis Fukuyama, State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Cen-
tury 92–93 (2004). 
15. Emmerich de Vattel described international law in the 1750s as “the rights subsisting between 
nations or states, and the obligations correspondent to those rights.” Emmerich de Vattel, The Law 
of Nations Preliminaries § 3 (Joseph Chitty et al. trans. & ed. 1883) (1758). 
16. See generally Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 3. 
17. “Whose territory, his religion.” 
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cept of pooled sovereignty that has steadily expanded and deepened in the 
contemporary EU. As the EU’s legal system has evolved, the prime purpose 
of the European Court of Justice and even of the Commission has been less 
to create and impose EU law as international law than to spur national courts 
and regulatory agencies to embrace and enforce EU law as national law. 
Moreover, as Mark Leonard writes in his provocative new book Why Europe 
Will Run the 21st Century, “Europe’s weapon is the law.”18 He describes Europe’s 
power in the world as “a transformative power,”19 rooted in a strategy of 
democratization that is based on requiring candidate countries to “swallow 
all 80,000 pages of European laws and adapt their own legislation to accommo-
date them,” as well as then accepting continual monitoring by EU ofªcials 
to ensure that they are in fact living up to their new commitments.20 The 
result has been a “rebuilding [of] these countries from the bottom up.”21 In-
deed, “[t]he European model is the political equivalent of the strategy of the 
Jesuits: if you change the country at the beginning, you have it for life.”22 
Note the precise way that European law works in this equation. For all 
the 80,000 pages of regulations, the EU Council of Ministers and the EU 
Commission issue directives that specify ends rather than means. It is up to 
national legislatures and courts to decide precisely how the member state in 
question will fulªll a particular directive. Once those laws are passed, EU 
institutions—the Court and the Commission—look over national shoulders 
to ensure that they actually do what they commit to do. This European way 
of law is precisely the role that we postulate for international law generally 
around the world.23 
 
                                                                                                                      
18. Leonard, supra note 6, at 35. 
19. Id. at 5 (quoting Richard Youngs, Engagement: Sharpening European Inºuence, in Global Europe 
Report 2: New Terms of Engagement 1, 5 (Richard Youngs ed., 2004)). 
20. Leonard, supra note 6, at 45. 
21. Id. Others have suggested that these changes are, at times, imposed instead from the top down, 
and may be indicative of a democratic deªcit in the EU. See, e.g., Giandomenico Majone, Europe’s Democ-
ratic Deªcit: A Question of Standards, 4 Eur. L.J. 5 (1998) (observing that the “democratic deªcit . . . refers 
to the legitimacy problems of non-majoritarian institutions, i.e., institutions which by design are not 
directly accountable to the voters or to their elected representatives”); Jeremy Rabkin, Is EU Policy Erod-
ing the Sovereignty of Non-Member States?, 1 Chi. J. Int’l L. 273, 273 (2000) (arguing that the EU is based 
on a “systematic program of eroding or reconªguring national sovereignty”). For a perspective on the EU 
that rejects the danger of the democratic deªcit and accords more closely with our vision, see Andrew 
Moravcsik, In Defense of the Democratic Deªcit: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union, 40 J. Common 
Market Stud. 603 (2002). 
22. Leonard, supra note 6, at 45–46. 
23. Beyond the EU system, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) has repeatedly forced 
European governments to change their domestic laws governing issues from prosecution of criminals to 
admitting homosexuals into the armed services. Governments are all entitled to a “margin of apprecia-
tion” in reconciling their domestic laws and practices with their treaty obligations, but the ECtHR is 
there to ensure that the margin does not grow too wide. See, e.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1976) (applying the margin of appreciation to freedom of speech); Jersild v. 
Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994) (holding the margin of appreciation breached in the prosecu-
tion of a journalist for racist speech); Lustig-Prean & Beckett v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 548, 
587 (1999) (holding that the plaintiffs were wrongly discharged “on the grounds of their homosexuality” 
and requiring a change in UK policy toward sexual orientation in the military); Zana v. Turkey (No. 57), 
1997-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 2533 (holding that Turkey has a margin of appreciation in regulating incitement 
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Espen Barth Eide, a former state secretary in the Norwegian Foreign Min-
istry, writes that the “EU’s ‘soft’ intervention in the ‘domestic affairs’ of EU 
member states is almost an everyday experience.”24 This is the hallmark of 
EU-style “post-Westphalian sovereignty,” described so memorably by Robert 
Cooper, a top aide to Javier Solana, in The Breaking of Nations.25 Eide and other 
leading European security strategists openly call for the extension of regional 
“integrative projects” based on the EU in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. 
The European Security Strategy, proposed by Javier Solana26 and passed by 
the European Council in December 2003, fell short of openly embracing this 
vision, but recognized that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(“ASEAN”), the Southern Cone Common Market (“MERCOSUR”), and the 
African Union “make an important contribution to a more orderly world.”27 
Spreading the European way of law beyond Europe, a process that is al-
ready underway, requires a broader rethinking of the functions of interna-
tional law. As in Europe, the focus of a growing number of international rules is 
no longer interstate relations; it is increasingly governments’ capacity and 
will to act in prescribed ways toward their own peoples. The result is a growing 
interaction between international law and domestic politics, in ways that have 
lasting implications for both. 
II. The Future Functions of International Law 
The all-too-often inadequate domestic response to transnational threats 
has three separate but related causes: a lack of domestic governance capacity, 
a lack of domestic will to act, and new problems that exceed the ordinary 
ability of states to address. International law has key leverage points to help 
improve the response of domestic governments in each of these three ways. 
International legal rules and institutions can enhance the capacity and effec-
tiveness of domestic institutions. If properly designed and structured they 
can help backstop domestic political and legal groups trying to comply with 
international legal obligations. Finally, they can even compel or mandate 
action at the national level in response to a global threat. The following sec-
 
                                                                                                                      
by Kurdish politicians). 
24. Espen Barth Eide, Introduction: The Role of the EU in Fostering “Effective Multilateralism,” in Effec-
tive Multilateralism: Europe, Regional Security and a Revitalized UN 1, 1–10 (Espen Barth 
Eide ed., 2004).  
25. See generally Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the 21st 
Century (2003). 
26. Javier Solana is the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union and the European Un-
ion High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Should the proposed EU Consti-
tution eventually enter into force, he is expected to be appointed Foreign Minister of the EU. The Euro-
pean Council is the “main decision-making body of the EU” and is composed of the ministers of the 
member states for any particular subject area. See Council of the European Union, http://ue.eu.int/cms3_ 
fo/showPage.asp?id=242&lang=EN&mode=g (last visited Mar. 23, 2006). 
27. Javier Solana, A Secure Europe in a Better World—The European Security Strategy 
9 (2003), http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. 
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tions will examine each of these ways that international law can and in some 
cases is beginning to play a new role in domestic governance. 
A. Strengthening Domestic Institutions 
A primary limitation of the international system is the weakness of gov-
ernment institutions in so many states all over the world. Due to violence, pov-
erty, disease, corruption, and limited technology or training, national gov-
ernments all too often lack the resources, skills, and ability to provide ade-
quate solutions to local and transnational problems. Examples are numerous: 
state failure in Somalia in the early 1990s, devastation from natural catas-
trophes like the 2004 tsunami, civil wars such as that in Angola from 1998 
to 2003, or the rampant corruption all too evident in Russia in the mid-
1990s. A 2004 report of the Commission on Weak States and U.S. National 
Security highlighted as a key national security concern the need to assist states 
“whose governments are unable to do the things that their own citizens and 
the international community expect from them: offer protection from inter-
nal and external threats, deliver basic health services and education, and 
provide institutions that respond to the legitimate demands and needs of the 
population.”28 Improving the capacity of government ofªcials of all sorts—
regulators, judges, and legislators—to actually govern is paramount.29 Fran-
cis Fukuyama observes: “For the post–September 11th period, the chief issue 
for global politics will not be how to cut back on stateness but how to build 
it up.”30 International law has an important role to play in this process. 
A critically important tool in strengthening the institutions of national 
governments is the formalization and inclusion of “government networks” as 
mechanisms of global governance. These largely voluntary networks link to-
gether domestic governmental ofªcials from different countries in similar ªelds 
or spheres of responsibility. Such networks provide an effective means to 
harness national regulatory systems in the pursuit of common, international 
goals. Such networks can help harmonize national policies and can support 
the efforts of domestic ofªcials vis-à-vis their own governments. 
These networks of national government ofªcials of all kinds are already 
operating across borders to regulate individuals and corporations operating in a 
global economy, combat global crime, and address common problems on a 
global scale.31 They perform a range of functions that enhance the effective-
ness of domestic governance. They build trust and establish relationships 
among their participants that create incentives to establish a good reputa-
tion and avoid a bad one. They regularly exchange information about their 
own activities and develop databases of best practices, or, in the judicial sphere, 
 
                                                                                                                      
28. Weinstein et al., supra note 13, at 6.  
29. For a discussion of the importance of building state capacity, see Problematic Sovereignty: 
Contested Rules and Political Possibilities (Stephen Krasner ed., 2001). 
30. Fukuyama, supra note 14, at 120. 
31. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004). 
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different approaches to common legal issues. Finally, they offer technical assis-
tance and professional socialization to members—whether regulators, judges, or 
legislators—from less developed nations.32 
If their existence and capacities were more widely recognized, government 
networks could do far more to strengthen domestic governance. Building the 
basic capacity to govern in countries that often lack sufªcient material and 
human resources to pass, implement, and apply laws effectively is itself an im-
portant and valuable consequence of government networks. Regulatory, ju-
dicial, and legislative networks all engage in capacity-building directly, through 
training and technical assistance programs, and indirectly, through their 
provision of information, coordinated policy solutions, and moral support to 
their members. In effect, government networks communicate to their mem-
bers everywhere the message that the Zimbabwean chief justice understood 
when he was under siege and commented, “I am not alone.”33 
The best examples of transnational networks strengthening domestic gov-
ernance may be in the area of regulatory export. Kal Raustiala offers a num-
ber of examples of regulatory export in the securities, environmental, and 
antitrust areas. According to one securities regulator he interviewed, a prime 
outcome of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission networking is the 
dissemination of “the ‘regulatory gospel’ of U.S. securities law,” including: 
“strict insider trading rules; mandatory registration with a governmental 
agency of public securities issues; a mandatory disclosure system; issuer liability 
regarding registration statements and offering documents; broad antifraud pro-
visions; and government oversight of brokers, dealers, exchanges, etc.”34 In 
effect, U.S. regulatory agencies make their own jobs easier by offering tech-
nical assistance and training to their foreign counterparts, because strong for-
eign authorities with compatible securities, environmental, and antitrust 
regimes will effectively extend the reach of U.S. regulators. 
The EU has enjoyed similar advantages through the International Compe-
tition Network (“ICN”). As a result, a growing number of countries, particu-
larly in Eastern Europe, are copying the EU approach to competition policy 
rather than the U.S. model.35 The opening conference of the ICN, led by the 
head of the German competition agency, was held in Italy in 2002. The 
network describes itself as “a project-oriented, consensus-based, informal net-
work of antitrust agencies from developed and developing countries that will 
 
                                                                                                                      
32. For examples of this phenomenon among judges, see Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International 
Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 (2002); 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 Va. J. Int’l L. 1103 (2000). For discussion in the regu-
latory context, see Slaughter, supra note 31. 
33. Slaughter, supra note 31, at 99. 
34. Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law, 6 J. Int’l Econ. L. 
841, 843 (2003). 
35. See Slaughter, supra note 31, at 175. Although the United States originally pushed the idea of a 
global network of antitrust regulators under the Clinton administration, the Bush administration has 
proven less enthusiastic. The lack of U.S. engagement in the process presently gives the EU considerable 
inºuence on global regulatory development. 
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address antitrust enforcement and policy issues of common interest and for-
mulate proposals for procedural and substantive convergence through a results-
oriented agenda and structure.”36 
Other examples of such networks strengthening domestic capacity in the 
economic arena include the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision37 and 
the International Organization of Securities Commissioners, which have been 
inºuential in enhancing the ability of national governments to regulate se-
curities and maintain independent central banks.38 The net result of these 
networks is twofold: ªrst, convergence toward a set of standardized practices 
at the national level and, second, the creation of greater domestic regulatory 
capacity in participating nations. 
It should not be assumed that regulatory expertise ºows only from devel-
oped to developing countries. At least in the judicial arena, European and 
Canadian courts have learned as much from South African and Indian courts 
as vice versa.39 Among regulators, local experience with a wide range of 
problems can count for a great deal in the exchange of best practices. 
Governments can do much more to strengthen domestic governance through 
government networks. For example: strengthening the International Network 
for Environmental Cooperation and Enforcement, composed of environmental 
ofªcials; expanding the inclusivity and representativeness of global ªnancial 
and leadership networks (such as expanding the G-8 to the G-20); creating a 
Global Justice Network of justice ministers; creating a Global Human Rights 
Network of the government ofªcials responsible for human rights conditions; 
and bringing networks of legislators together under the auspices of the United 
Nations and other international institutions. Such networks must be pro-
vided with both concrete tasks and the resources to accomplish them, ena-
bling states to work together to strengthen both collective and individual 
governance capacity. 
As the front line of authority, national government ofªcials exercise an ar-
ray of coercive and persuasive powers largely unmatched by international insti-
tutions. National governments, by operating through government networks, 
can bring these same powers to bear on behalf of international legal obliga-
 
                                                                                                                      
36. International Competition Network, Memorandum on the Establishment and Operation of the 
International Competition Network, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/mou.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2006). 
37. See David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 Chi. J. Int’l 
L. 547, 595 (2005). 
38. Id. at 561; see also International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2002 Ann. Rep. 22 (2002), 
http://dev.iosco.org/annual_report/PDF/IOSCO_2002.pdf. 
39. For a general discussion, see Slaughter, supra note 31, at 65–103. For an example of cross-
citation by the South African Constitutional Court, see State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) 
(S. Afr.). For an example of borrowing by a developed country, see Regina v. Bow St. Metro Stipendiary 
Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999), in which the English 
House of Lords cited to no fewer than twenty-one foreign judgments of countries including the United 
States, France, Israel, and Chile. The fact that such borrowing runs in both directions—from the devel-
oped world to the developing world and back again—goes far to counter the criticism that such networks 
are merely a form of neo-colonial imposition. 
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tions. They can coerce, cajole, ªne, order, regulate, legislate, horse-trade, 
bully, or use whatever other methods that produce results within their po-
litical system. They are not subject to coercion at the transgovernmental level; 
on the contrary, they are likely to perceive themselves as choosing a speciªc 
course of action freely and deliberately. Yet, having decided, for whatever 
reasons, to adopt a particular code of best practices, to coordinate policy in a 
particular way, to accept the decision of a supranational tribunal, or even simply 
to join what seems to be an emerging international consensus on a particular 
issue, they can implement that decision within the limits of their own do-
mestic power. 
The international legal system could harness the power of transgovern-
mental networks much more effectively than it does currently. For example, 
international law could more explicitly recognize the role of such networks 
and the soft regulations they often produce. Hard legal instruments could man-
date or facilitate the creation of transnational networks in a range of areas of 
critical state weakness such as justice and human rights. Where the weak-
ness of a particular government in a functional area poses a threat to interna-
tional order, the U.N. Security Council could require state participation in 
such a network. Government networks offer an important tool to improve 
state capacity. Actors within the international legal system would be well 
served to partner with such networks and more directly integrate them into 
larger international legal frameworks. 
Once again, the international legal system would be taking a leaf from the 
EU’s book in this regard. Most EU law gets made and implemented through 
transgovernmental networks of EU ofªcials, from ministers on down. In-
deed, Mark Leonard describes the EU as “a decentralised network that is owned 
by its member-states.”40 Reaching outside the borders of Europe, the EU has 
sought to extend the network model to the Middle East and North Africa 
through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.41 
Beyond government networks, Stephen Krasner suggests that interna-
tional law and institutions can strengthen state capacity by engaging in 
processes of shared sovereignty with national governments. Such shared sov-
ereignty “involves the creation of institutions for governing speciªc issue areas 
within a state—areas over which external and internal actors voluntarily 
share authority.”42 Examples of these arrangements include the creation of spe-
cial hybrid courts in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and, possibly, Cambodia, in-
volving a mix of international and domestic law and judges. Similarly, a pro-
 
                                                                                                                      
40. Leonard, supra note 6, at 23 (citing Manuel Castells, The End of Millennium (2000)). 
41. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, also known as the Barcelona Process, is a “wide framework 
of political, economic and social relations between the Member States of the European Union and Part-
ners of the Southern Mediterranean” launched in Barcelona in 1995. European Union, Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership/Barcelona Process, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed (last visited Mar. 9, 
2006). 
42. Stephen D. Krasner, Building Democracy After Conºict: The Case for Shared Sovereignty, 16 J. Democ-
racy, Jan. 2005, at 69, 76. 
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posed oil pipeline agreement between Chad and the World Bank would in-
volve shared control and governance.43 Such shared sovereignty, Krasner 
claims, can “gird new political structures with more expertise, better-crafted 
policies, and guarantees against abuses of power” onto weak or failing states.44 
Even within a more traditional framework, the international legal system 
can employ a range of mechanisms to strengthen the hand of domestic gov-
ernments. Legal instruments and codes of international best practices can set 
standards to give national governments benchmarks for enhancing their own 
capability.45 International institutions can provide aid and assistance speciªcally 
targeted for the domestic institutions of the recipient state. 
International ªnancial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
(“IMF”) and the World Bank may play a particularly powerful role in build-
ing domestic capacity. Conditionality requirements give these bodies strong 
inºuence over domestic outcomes. The IMF’s success in enhancing the capa-
bilities of domestic governments is much debated,46 but the World Bank 
may have a better track record.47 Part of the Bank’s strategy in Africa has 
been to “put countries in the driver’s seat” with a “platform of strong public 
capacity: capacity to formulate policies; capacity to build consensus; capacity 
to implement reform; and capacity to monitor results, learn lessons, and 
adapt accordingly.”48 Whatever their successes and failures to date, the IMF 
and the World Bank have signiªcant leverage to enhance domestic govern-
ment capacity. What they need is far more input from borrower countries, or 
at least reformers and political activists in borrower countries, about how 
best to achieve this goal. 
Incorporating these types of mechanisms into future legal regimes as a means 
of promoting domestic capacity-building must be an ongoing priority. These 
mechanisms include building government networks, providing technical assis-
tance, setting benchmarks and standards, or encouraging other forms of co-
 
                                                                                                                      
43. See generally id. 
44. Id. at 70. 
45. In the ªeld of judicial independence, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
provides a set of such benchmarks. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 9–11, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Additionally, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
offers further clariªcation and a potential legal testing ground. Rome Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Court art. 17, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].  
46. For two sides of this debate, see Randall Stone, Lending Credibility: The International 
Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition 233–34 (2002) (arguing that IMF condi-
tionality is appropriate and beneªcial) and James Vreeland, The IMF and Economic Development 
160–65 (2003) (suggesting that IMF conditionality may retard domestic development). 
47. See Poul Engberg-Pedersen & Brian Levy, Building State Capacity in Africa: Learning from Perform-
ance and Results, in Building State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons 87 
(Brian Levy & Sahr Kpundeh eds., 2004) (discussing the role of the World Bank in enhancing state ca-
pacity in Africa); see also Joel D. Barkan et al., Emerging Legislatures: Institutions of Horizontal Accountability, 
in Building State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons 233–34 (Brian Levy 
& Sahr Kpundeh eds., 2004) (discussing increased awareness across anglophone Africa of developments in 
peer legislatures as a possible result of World Bank initiatives). 
48. Frannie A. Léautier & Callisto Madavo, Foreword to Building State Capacity in Africa: New 
Approaches, Emerging Lessons, at v (Brian Levy & Sahr Kpundeh eds., 2004). 
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operation. Abram and Antonia Chayes have explained how this can be done 
through a “managerial model” of compliance.49 According to this model, the 
task of maximizing compliance with a given set of international rules is a 
task more of management than of enforcement, ensuring that all parties know 
what is expected of them, that they have the capacity to comply, and that 
they receive the necessary assistance. To the degree Chayes and Chayes are cor-
rect,50 formal international legal regimes must recognize and promote the 
capacity-building needs of domestic governance through government net-
works, technical assistance, benchmarks and standards, or other forms of coop-
eration. 
More broadly, the success of many policies at the international level de-
pends on political choices at the national level, for example, choices concern-
ing the allocation of resources or the establishment of particular institutions. 
The effectiveness of international law may thus depend on its ability to shape 
political outcomes and institutional structures within states. At the same 
time, however, a feedback loop from domestic to international institutions 
becomes crucial for both accountability and effectiveness. Thus the various 
mechanisms canvassed above to strengthen domestic government institu-
tions must be carefully designed. 
B. Backstopping Domestic Government 
A second means through which international law can foster more effective 
domestic governance is by backstopping domestic institutions where they 
fail to act. In some ways, this idea is not new at all, but rather follows from a 
long intellectual tradition. Without developed international institutions 
such as the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), cooperation among the 
criminal justice mechanisms of states provided a primitive form of back-
stopping by ensuring that some state would prosecute an accused criminal 
even if the territorial state of the crime failed to act. Indeed, as early as 1625, 
Hugo Grotius recognized that the domestic courts of various states could 
backstop one another. Referring to an early form of the prosecute or extra-
dite requirement, Grotius observed: “[I]t seems reasonable, that the State 
where the convicted Offender lives or has taken Shelter, should, upon Appli-
cation being made to it, either punish the demanded person according to his 
Demerits, or else deliver him up to be treated at the Discretion of the in-
 
                                                                                                                      
49. Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty 3 (1995). 
50. This model is distinct both in underlying assumptions and in the resultant variables that govern 
state compliance from carrot-and-stick or norm-socialization approaches. See, e.g., George W. Downs et 
al., Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?, 50 Int’l Org. 379 (1996) (offering a 
carrot-and-stick model); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, International Law and State Socialization: 
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jured party.”51 Centuries later, in the early 1920s, M. Maurice Travers devel-
oped the concept of “la superposition des compétences législatives concurrentes,” sug-
gesting that the layering of overlapping jurisdiction of a number of states 
would allow national courts to reinforce one another.52 What is new today is 
that international institutions—rather than the national courts of third states—
are making a conscious effort to backstop their national counterparts. Struc-
tural rules that explicitly seek to further this backstopping function are now 
embedded in the very statutes of international tribunals and institutions. 
The most obvious example of international law as a backstop is the com-
plementarity provision of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court. The ICC is designed to operate only where national courts fail to act 
as a ªrst line means of prosecution. Article 17 of the Rome Statute provides 
that the Court shall determine a case is inadmissible if “the case is being 
investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless 
the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution.”53 The ICC can step in and provide a second line of defense in 
cases where domestic institutions fail “due to a total or substantial collapse 
or unavailability of its national judicial system,”54 or where a state is unwill-
ing to prosecute “independently or impartially.”55 In other words, if the United 
States or Iraq were a member of the ICC and both states proved unable or 
unwilling to prosecute fully all members of the military involved in the 
abuses at Abu Ghraib, the ICC would have jurisdiction. 
Other forms of international institutional design may similarly result in a 
backstopping function. In various human rights courts, the requirement that 
individuals ªrst exhaust local remedies gives states—and particularly their 
domestic courts—an incentive to reach conclusions acceptable to the inter-
national institution so that the international court need not intervene to review 
the case.56 Similarly, the dispute resolution mechanisms of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) have served as an international backstop 
 
                                                                                                                      
51. 2 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace 1062 (Richard Tuck trans., Liberty Fund 
2005) (1625). 
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54. Id. art. 17(3). 
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56. Article 35 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that “[t]he Court may only 
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Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 35(1), Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 
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for domestic resolution of antidumping cases.57 Under NAFTA, interna-
tional arbitral panels are given the authority to review domestic administra-
tive decisions and can remand decisions back to the issuing agency with guid-
ance on acceptable outcomes. If the agency issues an acceptable ruling, no 
further action is taken. Yet, if the panels remain unsatisªed with the agency’s 
response, they can issue a further ruling and remand the case yet again.58 Like 
the Rome Statute’s complementarity regime, this remand procedure gives 
domestic institutions within NAFTA countries an incentive to act ªrst and 
to get it right. Where they fail to do so, the international process provides a 
backstop. 
The actual effect of such backstopping provisions in international institu-
tional design is twofold.59 First, and most obvious, is the provision of a sec-
ond line of defense when national institutions fail. Second, and potentially 
more powerful, is the ability of the international process to catalyze action at 
the national level. This second effect most often occurs when a domestic le-
gal or political process exists that could be utilized, should the domestic 
government decide to do so, but government ofªcials, or at least some pow-
erful group of such ofªcials, deem that the political or ªnancial costs of do-
mestic action outweigh the beneªts. In such cases the existence of an inter-
national tribunal with concurrent jurisdiction can provide structural incen-
tives that shift the cost-beneªt calculation and result in the use of a domes-
tic process that would otherwise have been neglected. The political beneªts 
of adjudicating matters domestically rather than giving jurisdiction to an 
international tribunal over which domestic ofªcials have little or no control 
creates new incentives to act locally. 
The ICC already appears to be having such a catalytic effect in two of the 
ªrst situations it is investigating: the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
the Darfur region of Sudan. In the wake of the ICC Prosecutor’s 2003 an-
nouncement of an investigation in Congo, a range of efforts were initiated 
by certain elements within the Congolese government to reform the Congo-
lese judiciary so as to be able to assert primacy over the ICC and undertake 
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national proceedings.60 Similarly, after the Prosecutor opened an investiga-
tion in Darfur, local courts, though of questionable legitimacy, were estab-
lished to initiate domestic proceedings.61 The ICC Prosecutor has himself 
suggested that complementarity may encourage domestic prosecutions. As 
he argued upon his swearing-in as the Court’s ªrst Prosecutor, “the absence 
of trials before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of 
national institutions, would be a major success.”62 
International legal institutions operating as a backstop need not be lim-
ited to purely international courts. Adjudication in foreign domestic courts 
may likewise enhance the willingness of national judiciaries in territorial 
states to act themselves. The recent advances by Chilean courts toward the 
prosecution of Augusto Pinochet is, in part, due to the international commu-
nity—acting largely through the Spanish and English judiciaries—getting 
serious about ensuring accountability for his crimes.63 The prosecution by 
Spain and the proceedings in England64—though they did not result in a 
conviction—made clear to the Chileans that other options existed if they 
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Ever Answer to the People of Chile?, Times (London), Sept. 14, 2004, at 10. 
64. See Regina v. Bow St. Metro Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 
A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999).  
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themselves refused to prosecute and may have bolstered the willingness of 
Chilean courts to hold Pinochet accountable.65 
The backstopping effect of international institutions will take different 
forms and often be case speciªc. Sometimes, the international institution will 
generate incentives for domestic governmental authorities to act at home as 
an alternative to international prosecution. At other times, particularly where 
powerful actors within a national government lack the political will to act at 
home, the international institution may alter the balance in a domestic power 
struggle, strengthening the hand of those national ofªcials who want to act. 
Alternatively, where the domestic government truly lacks the capacity to 
act, the international institution can backstop domestic courts by genuinely 
providing another forum. In any of these situations the international institu-
tion directly affects domestic government decisions, changing the incentives 
for domestic action and providing a second, international, forum for legal 
action.66 It becomes a tacit actor in domestic political processes, pressuring 
national governments to reach speciªc political outcomes and helping to create 
the conditions to make them possible. 
C. Compelling Action by National Governments 
The effectiveness of international law in responding to new transnational 
threats will, to an ever greater degree, require the active cooperation of na-
tional institutions. Despite the proliferation of international courts and tri-
bunals,67 national governments have retained the nearly exclusive use of 
their instruments of coercive authority. In most cases, national governments 
alone can use the police power, a national judiciary, or the military—the tools 
necessary to address transnational threats before they grow and spread. In 
many cases, backstopping and strengthening domestic institutions will be 
sufªcient to ensure that national governments use their power to address pre-
sent and potential dangers. At times, however, domestic governments may 
be unwilling to use these institutions, either due to differing perceptions of 
national interest, a lack of political will, or inªghting within governments 
themselves. In these cases, international law can be effective only by ªnding 
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new ways to ensure that national governments actually use the tools at their 
disposal to address such threats before they spread. 
International legal rules have long sought to constrain or mandate the be-
havior of states toward other states and toward other states’ citizens. More 
recently, international treaties have required national governments to enact 
domestic legislation of various sorts, such as the domestic criminalization of 
certain transnational acts.68 The type of compulsion described here, however, 
speciªcally directs domestic government institutions to go about what was 
formerly purely domestic business in particular ways. And it does so not by 
speciªc agreement on particular legal obligations that must then be domes-
tically implemented, but rather by establishing general goals and requiring 
domestic governments to achieve them through a broad range of measures. 
EU directives work this way; in U.S. law, however, Congress is speciªcally 
prohibited from imposing broad general mandates requiring individual 
states to devise and pass speciªc legislation to achieve them.69 
The use of international law to combat terrorism immediately after Sep-
tember 11, 2001, is a prime example of how speciªc obligations can be im-
posed on U.N. member states that they can fulªll only by directing domes-
tic institutions to act in speciªc ways at the national level. U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1373, for example, requires states to “prevent the com-
mission of terrorist acts” and “deny safe haven to those who ªnance [or] plan 
. . . terrorist acts.”70 The resolution demands, among other things, the do-
mestic criminalization of the ªnancing of terrorism, freezing of terrorist as-
sets by national authorities, use of domestic courts to bring to justice those 
involved in terrorist acts, and ratiªcation by domestic authorities of relevant 
anti-terrorism conventions.71 
The White House describes Resolution 1373 as setting “new, strict stan-
dards for all states to meet in the global war against terrorism.”72 Likewise, 
the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terror-
ism (“Financing Convention”) and the International Convention for the Sup-
pression of Terrorist Bombing (“Bombing Convention”) require states to take 
concrete domestic action. The Financing Convention obliges states to “take 
appropriate measures . . . for the . . . seizure of any funds used or allocated 
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for” the ªnancing of terrorism,73 while the Bombing Convention requires 
domestic criminalization of terrorist acts and the afªrmative use of national 
judicial institutions to bring to justice the perpetrators of terrorist acts.74 
Resolution 1373 links both the compelling and strengthening functions 
of the international legal system. Beyond merely mandating domestic action, 
the resolution establishes a Counter-Terrorism Committee that is tasked with 
monitoring the implementation of the resolution and increasing the “ability 
of States to ªght terrorism.”75 The Committee requires regular reporting by 
states of steps taken to comply with Resolution 1373 and provides expert 
advice on issues ranging from legislative drafting to customs requirements 
and policing.76 Working jointly with international, regional, and sub-regional 
organizations, the Committee shares “codes, standards and best practices in 
their areas of competence.”77 In addition, the Committee makes available a 
database of technical assistance and a team of expert advisors to assist states 
in compliance.78 By April 2005, at least one report had been received from 
all 191 member states; the Secretary-General has described state cooperation 
with the Committee to date as “unprecedented and exemplary.”79 
The Security Council’s recent initiatives in the area of non-proliferation 
have imposed similar obligations on national governments and their respec-
tive sub-state institutions to take afªrmative domestic action. Security Council 
Resolution 1540, for example, requires states to adopt national legislation 
prohibiting the manufacture or possession of weapons of mass destruction by 
nonstate actors and to establish export control regulations and physical pro-
tection regimes for weapons and related technologies.80 While not going as 
far as the creation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the Security Coun-
cil again recognized the importance of capacity-building in ensuring domes-
tic action and invited states to offer assistance and resources to one another.81 
Likewise, functional international organizations such as the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) have compelled states to act through their 
own institutions. IAEA Safeguards Agreements with nuclear states, for ex-
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ample, require a national system of materials controls and the use of particu-
lar accounting mechanisms.82 
Admittedly, these new functions of international law may not always pro-
vide sufªcient leverage to produce desired outcomes of state behavior or con-
sistent compliance with international legal obligations. Particularly where 
states have purposefully excluded themselves from international institutions 
or lack the will to comply (such as is arguably the situation with the alleged 
Iranian nuclear weapons program in 2006), resort to other methods—ranging 
from diplomatic isolation to economic sanctions and, in extreme cases, the 
use of military force—may be needed. In such hard cases, the best hope of in-
ternational law is simply to push states toward participation in international 
institutions and the international legal system generally so that the functions of 
international law identiªed here can take hold and inºuence state behavior 
and outcomes.83 
To effectively respond to new international threats, international legal rules 
must penetrate the surface of the sovereign state by requiring governments 
to take speciªc domestic actions to meet speciªed targets. Sometimes simple 
backstopping of national institutions may be sufªcient to accomplish this 
task. In other circumstances, assistance and the bolstering of weak state ca-
pacity may be an essential prerequisite. At yet other times, international law 
may have to actively compel state action. When it does so, it once again seeks to 
alter the political choices of national governments and to compel states to 
utilize their national institutions in new ways. 
The most effective approach will often involve some combination of all 
three functions of international law. Leaders and legislators should then be held 
accountable by both their peers and their publics for whether and how their 
governments respond. 
III. The Dangers of Using International Law To Shape and 
Inºuence Domestic Politics 
On one level, using international law to build the will and capacity of 
states to act domestically offers great opportunities to enhance the effective-
ness of the international legal system. National governments will have new 
incentives to act. Domestic institutions will grow stronger, and can be har-
nessed in pursuit of international objectives. States can thus respond to transna-
tional threats more effectively and efªciently. 
Yet each of the new functions of the international system suggested here—
backstopping, strengthening, and compelling—is a double-edged sword. 
Backstopping national institutions can be counterproductive to the degree 
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states may defer to an international forum as a less politically and ªnancially 
costly alternative to national action.84 Well-intentioned efforts to help, often 
through NGOs as well as international institutions, can end up weakening 
local government actors by siphoning off both funds and personnel. The process 
of strengthening domestic institutions, if not properly designed and imple-
mented, can also squeeze out local domestic capacity.85 Finally, and most 
dangerously, by compelling national action, the international legal system may 
undermine local democratic processes and prevent domestic experimentation 
with alternate approaches.86 
The most signiªcant danger inherent in these new functions of interna-
tional law, however, lies in the potential of national governments to co-opt 
the force of international law to serve their own objectives. One of the mod-
ern limits to Westphalian concepts of sovereignty is the obligations imposed 
by international law—particularly human rights law—on the conduct of states 
toward their own citizens. Yet, by strengthening state capacity, international 
law may actually make states more effective at the very repression and abuse 
the interference challenge seeks to overcome. Similarly, by compelling state 
action, international law may give national governments new license to un-
dertake otherwise illegal or unjust policies. Where critical values such as 
human rights and state security are seen to be in conºict, international legal 
compulsion of policies that favor one value may come at the expense of the 
other. This tension is particularly problematic where a repressive regime is 
able to use compulsion at the international level as a cover or an excuse to 
undertake its own domestic policies that may undermine legitimate opposi-
tion groups and violate citizens’ rights. 
Nowhere is this danger more apparent than in the legal compulsion of 
counter-terrorism activity. Mary Robinson, former U.N. high commissioner 
for human rights, observes: “Repressive new laws and detention practices have 
been introduced in a signiªcant number of countries, all broadly justiªed by 
the new international war on terrorism.”87 Similarly, Kim Scheppele has docu-
mented the number of exceptions to international and domestic legal protec-
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tions that states have invoked under the cover of ªghting terrorism.88 Among 
the worst offenders, according to Human Rights First, are Tanzania, Indone-
sia, Russia, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan, each of which has undertaken “draco-
nian anti-terrorism laws” that compromise human rights and strengthen the 
hand of government vis-à-vis opposition groups.89 
If these new purposes of international law are to be both effective and just, 
the goal must be to maximize the beneªts of the backstopping, strengthen-
ing, and compelling functions while avoiding the dangers evident in the 
counter-terrorism case. The theoretical base of these new functions of inter-
national law is that domestic institutions can be used to further international 
legal objectives. Yet these same institutions can become sources of abuse by 
national governments. The challenge, then, is to design rules that will har-
ness the strengths of well-functioning domestic institutions while targeting 
and restricting the reach of abusive ones. 
One way of making such distinctions is for international law to consider 
directly the quality of domestic institutions. States with robust and independ-
ent institutions, strong constitutional frameworks, transparent political proc-
esses, and embedded systems of checks and balances are least likely to ap-
propriate international law for their own purposes and engage or abuse their 
newfound power. In these states, domestic legal protections and other insti-
tutions within the national government can prevent abuse or counter-balance 
the strength of other institutions. Abuses will still occur in states with good 
institutional frameworks; however, the assumption built into institutions 
like the ICC is that when abuses do occur in a well-governed state, that state’s 
own domestic system will provide an internal correction mechanism. It is 
these states with independent and transparent domestic institutions that should 
be most receptive to the new functions of the international legal system. Euro-
pean states, at least, largely bear out this prediction. 
The problem, of course, is that it is often the states that lack institutional 
independence and embedded checks and balances that are most in need of 
capacity-building or compulsion to address threats and challenges at home 
before they spread. Where international law does target such states, interna-
tional rules, regimes, and institutions will have to be designed to address both 
the capacity and quality of domestic governance. Checks and balances will 
have to be embedded into the system itself, pushing not only for particular 
substantive outcomes, but also for legitimate domestic processes to achieve 
those goals. Similarly, international regimes themselves will have to balance 
a range of competing values—such as human rights and national security—
rather than focus on one particular goal when compelling state action. 
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Finally, as is already becoming apparent, both this overall conception of 
international law and the speciªc functions described here will meet with 
ªerce resistance from states with very strong domestic legal systems, such as 
the United States, and from many states with very weak legal systems but 
strong political rulers. European states, as noted above, are accustomed to 
daily “soft intervention.” Other states, however, will be far less comfortable 
with such intervention. The United States will not be alone here, but it may 
well ªnd itself with a number of unsavory bedfellows. On the other hand, 
many European powers may ªnd it more difªcult than they expect to promote 
an EU-inspired model of pooled sovereignty among wary former colonies. 
IV. International Law, Domestic Politics 
International lawyers and political scientists alike have long been fasci-
nated with the blurring of the boundaries between domestic and international 
rules and institutions. In 1956, Philip Jessup made a hegemonic move, claim-
ing for international lawyers not only the classic domain of international law, 
but also “all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national 
frontiers,” which he dubbed “transnational law.”90 Forty-ªve years later, 
then-Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, a relative newcomer to the world of in-
ternational law, observed: “[I]nternational law is no longer conªned in rele-
vance to a few treaties and business agreements. Rather, it . . . regulates ac-
tions or events that transcend national frontiers.”91 
In political science, James Rosenau has popularized the concept of the 
“domestic-foreign frontier.”92 On this frontier, “domestic and foreign issues 
converge, intermesh, or otherwise become indistinguishable.”93 In his con-
ception, whereas a boundary is an imaginary line, a frontier is “a new and 
wide political space . . . continuously shifting, widening, and narrowing, simulta-
neously undergoing erosion with respect to many issues and reinforcement with respect 
to others[.]”94 What Rosenau ªnds striking about relations along this frontier 
is that individuals work out a wide range of solutions to various problems 
through a mix of domestic and international rules, rather than “through the 
nation-state system.”95 
Our proposition is actually a quite different one. We endorse the division 
between domestic and international affairs, at least conceptually. Although 
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it is quite possible, indeed likely, that international law is expanding to in-
clude all sorts of rules and institutions that have a hybrid domestic-
international character, as well as domestic rules reaching beyond borders, 
we suggest that traditional public international law, meaning treaties and 
custom operating among nations in their mutual relations, has a distinct iden-
tity and a distinct set of functions. We simply argue that those functions are 
changing fast. 
Our claim “that the future of international law is domestic” refers not 
simply to domestic law but to domestic politics. More precisely, the future of 
international law lies in its ability to affect, inºuence, bolster, backstop, and 
even mandate speciªc actors in domestic politics. International rules and 
institutions will and should be designed as a set of spurs and checks on do-
mestic political actors to ensure that they do what they should be doing anyway, 
that is, what they have already committed to do in their domestic constitu-
tions and laws. 
In this conception, it is perfectly acceptable to continue to distinguish con-
cretely between an “international” and a “domestic” sphere, even as we rec-
ognize that the boundary between them has blurred and that they intersect 
and even conºict in growing ways. Indeed, it is valuable for domestic politi-
cal actors—the prosecutors trying to bring a former government ofªcial to 
justice, the judges seeking to resist executive pressure to decide a case a par-
ticular way, the parliamentary faction trying to ªght global warming—to be 
able to point to a mandate, consequence, or spur from a distinct and separate 
political space. The result will be ever more elaborate two-level games,96 but 
each game will remain on its own board, no matter how complex and dense 
the links between them. 
What must change profoundly, however, is the legitimacy of allowing the 
architects of international rules and institutions to look within the domestic 
political sphere of all states actually and hypothetically subject to the rule or 
institution in question. This scrutiny cannot be undertaken with reference to 
speciªc parties and actors in actual states, but rather must be based on data 
culled from history and the social sciences about the likely incentives of those 
parties and actors in varying circumstances. The critical question must be 
how the content of speciªc rules and the processes and procedures of institu-
tions are likely to interact with, inºuence, or even change these incentives. 
In consequence, the very concept of sovereignty will have to adapt to em-
brace, rather than reject, the inºuence of international rules and institutions 
on domestic political processes. A harbinger of this shift is the new doctrine 
of the responsibility to protect. The responsibility to protect ªrst emerged 
from the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(“ICISS”), headed by former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans and 
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Special Advisor to the U.N. Secretary-General Mohamed Sahnoun.97 In De-
cember 2001 the ICISS issued an important and inºuential report entitled 
“The Responsibility to Protect,” which essentially called for updating the U.N. 
Charter to incorporate a new understanding of sovereignty.98 
In the Commission’s conception, the core meaning of U.N. membership 
has shifted from “the ªnal symbol of independent sovereign statehood and thus 
the seal of acceptance into the community of nations,”99 to recognition of a 
state “as a responsible member of the community of nations.”100 Nations are 
free to choose whether or not to sign the Charter; if they do, however, they 
must accept the “responsibilities of membership ºowing from their signa-
ture.”101 According to the ICISS, “[t]here is no transfer or dilution of state 
sovereignty. But there is a necessary re-characterization involved: from sover-
eignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions and 
external duties.”102 Internally, a government has a responsibility to respect 
the dignity and basic rights of its citizens; externally, it has a responsibility 
to respect the sovereignty of other states. 
Further, the ICISS places the responsibility to protect on both the state 
and on the international community as a whole. The ICISS insists that an 
individual state has the primary responsibility to protect the individuals 
within it.103 However, where the state fails in that responsibility, a secondary 
responsibility falls on the international community acting through the 
United Nations. Thus, “where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result 
of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in ques-
tion is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention 
yields to the international responsibility to protect.”104 
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These shifts may seem dramatic; they are certainly bold. But in the view 
of a group of leading European policy thinkers asked to consider how the EU 
should respond to the U.N. Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel Report on 
Threats, Challenges, and Change, EU states should go considerably further. 
They should “[p]romote ‘the Responsibility to Protect,’ while also reframing 
the sovereignty debate to cover a principle of both enhancing effective and le-
gitimate sovereignty of weak states, (through international assistance) and 
conditioning sovereignty on state behavior.”105 
International law and the international community itself are thus coming 
to have not only the right but in many cases also the obligation to intervene 
in and inºuence what were previously the exclusive jurisdiction and political 
processes of national governments. By strengthening, backstopping, and com-
pelling action at the national level, the international legal system has power-
ful tools at its disposal to alter domestic political outcomes. The future of 
international law ultimately depends on the future of international politics: 
the problems raised and the aspirations generated. If those problems and aspira-
tions arise from within states rather than between them, international law 
must follow suit to shape and regulate domestic government institutions. But if 
it is simultaneously to remain a distinct body of international law, it must 
develop a whole new set of effective relationships with those institutions and 
with entire bodies of domestic law. 
The EU is a great experiment with precisely this type of system, although 
one underpinned by a unique history and culture generating the necessary 
domestic political will and economic and social forces. The world is not likely 
to replicate this experience in terms of actual political and economic integra-
tion monitored by coercive supranational institutions. But to the extent that 
the European way of law uses international law to transform and buttress 
domestic political institutions, it is a model for how international law can 
function, and in our view, will and must function to address twenty-ªrst-
century international challenges. 
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